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Recent European Patent Box Tax Regimes and
an Analytical Consideration of If and How
the United States Should Implement
Its Own Patent Box
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Abstract
As the global economy is increasingly driven by the commercialization of highly mobile assets,
several Europeangovernments have sought to encourage investment in and retention of such assets
within their domestic borders by offering heavily incentivized tax rates on profits derived from
patents and other highly mobile assets. Notable among the European and Asian countries to enact
such patent-income tax incentives-colloquially known as patent box tax regimes-are Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands,and the United Kingdom. This paperaddresses the primary distinguishing features of these four regimes, including their effective tax rates, their scope, and their
general qualification requirements and further addresses the preliminary economic results of the
enactment of these regimes. Finally, this paper considers the shortcomings in the four regimes and
discusses how the United States can capitalizeon such shortcomings to enact a more effective patent
box tax regime.

I.

Introduction

A.

PREFACE

The ongoing competition between the governments of major economic powers to entice foreign nationals to invest within domestic borders has increasingly forced such governments to develop creative and innovative methods for reducing effective tax rates for
potential foreign corporate investors, especially on more mobile and more highly sought
after assets. One of the most recent and most rapidly growing corporate tax incentives
enacted by several national governments in an attempt to lure foreign innovation-based
Jason M. Brown is a J.D. Candidate at the SMU Dedman School of Law, Class of 2013, and an
Associate Managing Editor of The InternationalLawyer. He received his B.S. in Finance from Louisiana State
University in Shreveport.
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investment is what has become colloquially known as the patent box tax regime., Stated
simply, patent box taxation refers to the application of a "sharply reduce[d] . . . rate of
2
corporate tax applied to income resulting from qualifying [intellectual property]." Since
2007, several European and Asian governments, including Belgium, China, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, have added some form of patent box taxation to
their corporate tax systems. Additionally, the United Kingdom is currently in the process
of enacting their own patent box legislation, which is presently set to go into force in
2013. Commenters and tax professionals are increasingly calling for the United States to
enact a patent box regime of its own if it is serious about remaining competitive in the
global marketplace.3
This paper will first compare and contrast several of the current patent box models
employed by European countries. In addressing these regimes, consideration will be paid
to the effective tax rate provided by each, which forms of intellectual property qualify for
preferential tax treatment, whether acquired intellectual property falls in to the patent
box, what intellectual property-derived types of income receive a reduced rate of taxation,
and any additional requirements a company must meet before qualifying for preferential
tax treatment under the respective regimes. 4 Additionally it will discuss whether other
developed nations, most notably, the United States, should consider enacting patent box
regimes to remain competitive in the global market. This discussion will address the potential positive and negative effects of such regimes and will consider the roll the regimes
play in the greater tax competition debate. Finally, the paper will offer suggestions, based
on the available empirical evidence regarding the effects of patent box regimes, for how
other nations may structure their own patent box tax legislation to remain competitive in
the global race for innovation.
B.

PATENT

BoxEs

BACKGROUND

Patent box tax regimes (whose name is derived from the box corporations must check
on their tax form to qualify for the preferential tax rate5 ) are the product, in part at least,
of countries' intense desires to encourage corporations to engage in innovative research
and development and commercialization activities within their domestic borders. Modem
economies are based more on innovation and intellectual property than ever before, and
countries seeking to obtain or retain a competitive economic advantage in today's global
economy must find ways to encourage corporations in high-wage, innovation-based industries to remain in, and continue to obtain patents within, their borders. 6 Patents are
1. Robert D. Atkinson & Scott Andes, Patent Boxes: Innovation in Tax Policy and Tax Policy for Innovation

(Info. Tech. & Innovation Found., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2011, at 7-8, available at http-J/www.itif.org/files/
201 1-patent-box-final.pdf.
2. Jim Shanahan, Is It Time for Your Country to Consider the "PatentBox"?, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 3
(May 23, 2011), http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/201 ljis-it-time-foryour-country-toconsiderthe-patent_box.pdf.
3. Id. at 4, 7-8.
4. See generally id. at 8 (comparing four existing regimes in Europe); see also Alison L. Maxwell & Peter
Benesch, The UK Patent Box Proposal: How Does it Measure Up?, DLA PtPER Guly 27, 2011), http://www.dla
piper.com/the-uk-patent-box-proposal-how-does-it-measure-up/.
5. Atkinson & Andes, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Id.
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considered by many to be the "lifeblood of society" and the "wealth of nations" and are
highly sought after by developed nations.7 Unfortunately for national governments, patents are also highly mobile assets, and once a new innovation has been patented, the company holding it may be able move it offshore to a jurisdiction where the income from its
commercialization will be taxed at a lower rate. 8 In an effort to reduce the rate at which
patents are moved offshore-or worse, the rate at which companies elect to incorporate in
foreign locations-several countries have enacted patent box tax regimes that provide
highly competitive tax rates for income derived from the commercialization of patents
held within the country. 9 Patent boxes may be seen as the logical follow-up to the research and development tax credits currently offered by many countries: while the research and development credits serve to incentivize activities that are likely to result in
innovation, patent box regimes serve to entice innovative corporations to exploit such
innovations within the country. 10 For instance, if a given startup company intends to
expend significant capital developing a new mobile communications technology, the cost
of developing that technology will generally provide the developing corporation with
some kind of tax benefit, typically in the form of a tax deduction or a tax credit.I I In a
country that has enacted a patent box tax regime, some or all of the income subsequently
derived from the commercialization of that technology, such as licensing and royalty fees
or the production of goods utilizing the patent, will be taxed at a rate considerably lower
than the ordinary corporate income tax rate for that country.1 2 Such countries appear to
have a considerable advantage in recruiting new innovative businesses and retaining current domestic corporations that regularly participate in such innovative activities.
Although the Netherlands and Belgium first enacted their patent box regimes in 2007
and are frequently cited as the birthplaces of patent box taxation,1 3 the Republic of Ireland
first offered a form of patent box taxation in 1973.14 Section 34 of Ireland's Finance Act
1973 provided that "[a] resident of the State... shall be entitled to have any income from
a qualifying patent ... disregarded for all the purposes of the Income Tax Acts."' 5 Generally, the provision exempted all royalty and licensing income arising from patented goods
from the Irish taxpayer's income tax. 16 Ireland retained some form of its patent box regime until 2011, when it abolished the corporate tax incentive as a part of its National
Recovery Plan 2011-2014, a plan designed to alleviate growing economic concerns and
reduce increasing budget deficits. 17 Today, eight countries utilize patent box tax regimes,
'7. Wolfgang Kessler & Rolf Eicke, The Emergence of R&D Tax Regimes in Europe, 50 TAx NOTES INTr'L
845, 845 (June 9, 2008).
8. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 41 (2010); see also Global Survey of R&D Tax Incentives, DELOITTE (July 2011), www.
nam.org/DeloitteRD-Survey.
12. See Shanahan, supra note 2, at 3.
13. See id. at 6; Rachel Griffith & Helen Miller, PatentBoxes: An Innovative Way to Race to the Bottom?, VOX
(June 30, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6706.
14. See Finance Act, 1973 (Act No. 19/1973) (Ir.) § 34, availableat http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1973/en/
act/pub/0019/print.html.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. IR. DEPT. OF FiN., NATIONAL REcOVERY PLAN 2011-2014, at 96, available at http://budget.gov.ie/The
%20Naional%20Recovery%20Plan%202011-2014.pdf. Although the National Recovery Plan 2011-2014
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including Belgium, China, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and
Switzerland. Additionally, the United Kingdom is actively in the process of enacting its
own patent box legislation, which is currently set to go into effect in 2013.18 This paper
will compare and contrast the structures of the patent box regimes enacted by Belgium,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the proposed United Kingdom plan and will address
the immediate and potential effects of those regimes.
II.

Four Patent Box Regimes

A.

BELGIUM

The Belgian Patent Box, also known as the "deduction for patent income," was established by the Belgian government in 2007 and codified in Articles 205/1 through 205/4 of
the Belgian Income Tax Code.19 The patent income deduction regime allows companies
20
to deduct from their taxable income 80 percent of their gross qualifying patent income.
Consequently, only 20 percent of the taxpayer's gross patent income is taxed at the statutory corporate tax rate of 33.99 percent. 21 This structure yields an effective income tax
22
rate of 6.8 percent on profits arising from patents.
The Belgian preferential patent income tax regime is available not only to Belgian corporations, but also to any company that is subject to either Belgian corporate income tax
or Belgian non-resident corporate income tax (i.e., a Belgian permanent establishment of a
foreign company). 23 The deduction applies to gross income from patents or supplementary protection certificates owned by the Belgian company or Belgian permanent establishment because of its own development activities at a qualifying research and
development center located either in Belgium or abroad. 24 The Belgian patent box regime requires the research and development centers at which the patents are developed to
set forth the plan to abolish the tax exemption for patent royalties, the royalty exemption was not officially

abolished until the passing of section 26 of Finance Act 2011. See Finance Act 2011 (Act. No. 6/2011) (It.)
§ 26, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2011/en.act.2011.0006.pdf.
18. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 4.
19. CODE DES IMPOTS SUR LES REvEN'us [C.I.R.] art. 205/1-4 (Belg.). Official versions of Belgian legislation are available only in French and Dutch. This paper will rely in part on English translations and interpretations of the Belgian statute provided by accounting, legal, and financial services companies. To the extent

possible, multiple sources will be given to corroborate translations and interpretations.
20. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5; PatentIncsme Deduction, ERNST & YOUNG 1 (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.
ey.comlPublication/vwLUAssets/PatentIncome-Deduction-2011/$FILE/PID%202011 .pdf.
21. Patent Income Deduction, supra note 20, at 1; Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4.
22. Patent Income Deduction, supra note 20, at 1; Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4. This effective rate is
calculated by multiplying the amount of income available for taxation at the ordinary statutory rate by said
rate (i.e., 20 percent multiplied by 33.99 percent). This rate, as well as those to be discussed under other
regimes in this paper, represents the maximum effective tax rate for patent income provided by the Belgian
Patent Income Deduction Regime, as other innovation-related tax credits, such as research and development
credits, may further lower the rate. Patent Income Deduction, supra note 20, at 1. Such credits are beyond the

scope of this comment.
23. Patent Income Deduction, supra note 20, at 1; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5; Maxwell & Benesch, supra
note 4.
24. Dirk Van Stappen et al., New Patent Taxation Regime: PatentIncome Deduction Creates Opportunitiesfor
Innovative Companies, 14 INT'L TRANSFER PRICING J. 291, 291 (Sept./Oct. 2007); Shanahan, supra note 2, at
5.
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qualify as a "branch of activity" of the business for the patent and its subsequent income to
be eligible for the deduction.25 Generally, a branch of activity is "an entity or a division of
an entity that is capable of operating autonomously;" note, however, that there26 is no requirement that such research and development centers be located in Belgium.
The deduction is not limited to self-developed patents; it applies to income derived
from patents acquired by the Belgian company or permanent establishment "in full ownership, joint ownership, usufruct, or via license agreement," provided the company has
further developed the patented product or process at a research and development center
that, as above, qualifies as a branch of activity. 27 The research and development centers
employed for such development activities need not be owned by the company owning, and
subsequently exploiting, the patent; rather, the company is permitted to use contract research and development centers to further develop its acquired patents and to remain
potentially eligible for the patent income deduction, provided that it retains the substance
28
to perform and supervise such development activities at the center. On the other hand,
a Belgian company acting solely as such a contract research and development center for
third-party companies that own and commercialize the related patents may not claim a
29
deduction under the patent income deduction regime.
Patents and supplemental protection certificates are the only forms of intellectual property that qualify for the income deduction; know-how, trademarks, designs, models, secret
30
formulas, and copyrights do not qualify for the deduction. Additionally, a qualifying
patent need not be granted by the Belgian government or the European Union; patents
31
granted in other jurisdictions qualify as well.
The Belgian patent income deduction is applicable to income derived from both "(1)
patents that are licensed [to a third party] by a Belgian company or a Belgian permanent
establishment and (2) patents that are used in the manufacturing process of patented products [that] is done by the company or in its name," the latter of which is frequently referred to as "embedded patent income." 32 For the former, the amount of income eligible
33
for the deduction is based simply on the amount of royalties received. The amount of
the royalty income is limited, however, to the amount that is part of the company's taxable
income in Belgium and may not exceed the royalty that would have been agreed to be34
tween unrelated parties (i.e., the arm's length price). Therefore, a Belgian corporation
may not license patented technology to a subsidiary or other related corporation at an
unreasonable or overly inflated rate to claim a larger tax deduction.
The calculation of patent income when the company uses the patent to produce and sell
patented goods is based on the hypothetical fee the company would have received had it
25. Stappen et al., supra note 24, at 291; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5.
26. Stappen et al., supra note 24, at 291.
27. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5.
28. Stappen et al., supra note 24, at 292-93; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5.
29. Stappen et al., supra note 24, at 292-93; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5.
30. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5; PatentIncome Deduction, supra note 20, at 2.
31. PatentIncome Deduction, supra note 20, at 2; Maxwell & Benesch, supra, note 4.
32. Stappen et al., supra note 24, at 293; see also Maxwell & Benesch, supra, note 4.
33. Patent Income Deduction, supra note 20, at 2; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5.
34. Patent Income Deduction, supra note 20, at 2; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 5; Stappen et al., supra note 24, at
293. This arm's length transaction fee is calculated based on a transfer pricing analysis under Belgian law.
Patent Income Deduction, supra note 20, at 2.
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licensed the patent to an independent third-party company to manufacture the product
itself. While the Belgian Tax Code does not explicitly address the methods a company
may use in calculating this portion of the product's income, 35 "[i]n a recent decision, the
Belgian Ruling Commission accepted the use of three different transfer pricing techniques
to compute this portion: the costs, income and market approaches." 36 To be safe, the
company may obtain a preliminary ruling from the Belgian Rulings Commission on a
proposed pricing method prior to using that method to calculate its tax deduction under
the patent box regime; doing so will allow the company to claim income as patent income
37
without fear of the Belgian tax authorities later questioning the validity of the claim. Of
note, however, is that capital gains realized on the disposal of an otherwise eligible patent
38
are not covered by the Belgium patent income deduction regime.
In sum, the Belgium patent income reduction regime provides Belgian companies or
Belgian permanent establishments of foreign companies a 6.8 percent effective tax rate on
income derived by the company or permanent establishment from the commercialization
of its patents and supplemental protection certificates. The regime applies not only to
ordinary patent income (that is, licenses and royalties), but also to patent income embedded in the sales price of patented products. Moreover, it applies to both self-developed
patents as well as acquired patents, provided the latter have been further developed at a
qualifying research and development center.
B.

LUXEMBOURG

The Luxembourg patent box (also known as the IP box) was enacted by the Luxembourg government in December 2007 and codified in Article 50bis of the Luxembourg
Income Tax Act. 39 On March 5, 2009, Luxembourg tax authorities issued an administrative circular regarding Article 50bis of the Income Tax Act that was intended to clarify the
40
rules regarding the IP box regime.
The Luxembourg regime provides for an 80 percent exemption for net income derived
from qualifying intellectual property. 41 Consequently, only 20 percent of such income is
taxable at the statutory corporate tax rate of 28.8 percent, yielding an effective tax rate of
35. Stappen et al., supra note 24, at 293.
36. Wim Eynatten & Patrick Brauns, Benelux Tax Competition to Attract IP Income is on Again, 21 INT'L TAx
Ruv. 43, 43 (Mar. 2010).
37. Patent Income Deduction, supra note 20, at 3.
38. Id. at 2; Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 43.
39. Loi 234 du 21 dcembre 2007 Rbglement grand-ducal du 21 dcembre 2007 portant execution de
l'article 50bis, alin~a 6 de la loi modifi~e du 4 dcembre 1967 concemant l'imp6t sur le revenu [Law 234 of
December 21, 2007 Grand-Ducal Regulation of December 21, 2007 Implementing Article 50a, paragraph 6
of the Law of 4 December 1967 on Income Tax], JouRNAL OFFICIEL Du GRAND-DUCHP DE LUXEMBOURG
9JO.] [OFncia GAZETTE OF LUXEMBOURG], Dec. 21, 2007, p. 3961. Official English translations of Luxembourg statutes, cases, and administrative materials are not made available by the Luxembourg government.
Translations and interpretations by reputable financial and legal services firms will be provided as sources for
information contained relating to the Luxembourg patent box.
40. Luxembourg: Clarification on IP Regime, LOYENs & LOEFF 1 (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.loyensloeff.
com/nI-NL/News/Publications/Newsletters/NewsFlashLuxembourg/LLL NewsFlashI 1032009.pdf.
41. Luxembourg Intellectual Property Tax Regime, EuuNsT & YOUNG 3 (June 11, 2012), http://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAsse-s/Luxembourg-jnteflectuaa-Property-Tax-Regime/$FILE/Luxemburg%2OIntellectual%20Property%2OTax%2ORegime.pdf; Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 44.
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5.76 percent.42 An important note is that the exemption applies to net IP income as opposed to gross IP-derived income. 43 That is to say, the Luxembourg IP box generally
applies, regardless of the type of commercialization, only to the difference between the
gross revenue derived from the intellectual property and all expenses incurred in direct
economic connection with such revenue, including, for the first year in which the exemption is claimed, the activated (i.e., capitalized) expenses incurred in past years (e.g., the
present year's amortization expenses, etc.).44
The IP box regime applies to all
Luxembourg taxable companies, including permanent
establishments of foreign companies.45 A company need only economic ownership of the
qualifying intellectual property to exempt net income from the commercialization of such
intellectual property, and, in the event legal and economic ownership of the intellectual
property are split, the company with economic ownership rights is the company that will
6
benefit from such ownership.4
The IP box regime's exemption applies not only to self-developed intellectual property
but also to acquired intellectual property rights, with no requirement for additional development. 47 Intellectual property rights acquired from an "associated company," however,
do not qualify for the regime's exemption. 48 For the purposes of the IP box regime, an
associated company is a "company in which the company benefiting from the [intellectual
property rights] income has at least a 10 [percent] direct participation or is its direct shareholder of at least 10 [percent]. Or where both companies have a common direct shareholder of at least 10 [percent]."49 Outside of the associated company limitation, however,
the Luxembourg IP tax regime is not concerned with the source of the patent or other
qualifying intellectual property right; it looks only to see who currently has economic
ownership of the patent being exploited, not to who or where the intellectually property
was developed.
The Luxembourg IP box applies to a wide range of intellectual property. The statute
includes patents (including supplementary protection certificates), trademarks or brands,
designs, domain names, models, and software copyrights.5 O The subsequent Administrative circular expounds upon the list in the statute, providing that sports celebrities, for
example, who commercialize products under their name or image may qualify for the
regime as well.51
The scope of income to which the IP box applies is similarly broad, applying to ordinary IP income (e.g., royalty and licensing fees from third parties); to embedded income
42. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 7; Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4.
43. Luxembourg IntellectualProperty Tax Regime, supra note 41, at 3; Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4.
44. Luxembourg IntellectualProperty Tax Regime, supra note 41, at 3; Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4.
45. Luxembourg IP-Derived Income Tax Regime: Managing and Fostering R&D in Luxembourg, CLIFFORD
CHANCE 1 (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publication/2010/09/luxembourg.ip-derivedincometaxregime.html; Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 44.
46. Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 44; Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4.
47. Luxembourg Intellectual Property Tax Regime, supra note 41, at 2; Luxembourg: Clarification on IP Regime,
supra note 40, at 2.
48. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 7; Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4.
49. Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 44.
50. Id.; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 7.
51. Luxembourg IntellectualProperty Tax Regime, supra note 41, at 2; Luxembourg: Clarificationon IP Regime,
supra note 40, at 2.
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(i.e., the value of the IP determined to be included in the sale price of a patented good);
and even to capital gains income from any subsequent sales of the intellectual property
rights. 52 For the first category of IP income, the company is entitled to an 80 percent
exemption of all net royalty income.5 3 As mentioned above, for these purposes the net
income is calculated as the actual gross revenue from the commercialization of the patent
or IP right-the actual royalties received, in this case-deducted by "all expenses incurred
in direct economic connection with such revenue, including interest expenses from the
financing of IP rights, amortization[,] and potential impairments recorded on each particular IP right." 54 The 2009 Administrative circular clarified the meaning of the word royalty, stating that the only royalties to which the box shall apply are those that meet the
definition of royalty provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel55
opment's (OECD) Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital.
Article 12 of the OECD Model Convention defines royalties as "payments of any kind
received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary,
artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, any patent, trade mark, design or
model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial[,] or scientific experience."56 Therefore, a company seeking to apply the IP box's 80
percent exclusion must ensure that its royalty income aligns itself with this provision.
In the event a company uses an intellectual property right for its own activities, such as
the manufacture of a patented product, the Luxembourg IP box regime allows for a notional deduction of 80 percent of the income the company would have hypothetically
received in the event it licensed the intellectual property right to a third party at an arm's
length basis. 57 Finally, the IP box also allows for an 80 percent exemption for any net
gains realized upon the sale or transfer of an eligible intellectual property right. 5s Any
expenses directly incurred in connection with the intellectual property right that have
reduced its basis in the year of sale or any previous year will be recaptured upon alienation
of the right and decrease the amount of the exemption up to an amount equal to 80
59
percent of the gain.
The 2009 Administrative circular provided clarification on the valuation of intellectual
property rights when calculating capital gains or determining the value of a hypothetical
arm's length royalty transaction. 60 It provided that in these situations, the taxpayer is
permitted to use any generally accepted or commonly used international valuation
61
method.
52. Luxembourg Intellectual Property Tax Regime, supra note 41, at 3.
53. Id.; Luxembourg IP-Derived Income Tax Regime, supra note 45, at 2.
54. Luxembourg Intellectual Property Tax Regime, supra note 41, at 3; Luxembourg IP-DerivedIncome Tax Regime, supra note 45, at 2; Eynatten & Brauns, sitpra note 36, at 44-45; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 7.
55. Luxembourg: Clarification on IP Regime, supra note 40, at 1.
56. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Model Convention witb Respect to
Taxes on Income and on Capital,art. 12, para. 2 (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxtreaties/
1914467.pdf.
57. Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 44-45; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 7.
58. Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 44-45; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 7.
59. Luxembourg IP-Derived Income Tax Regime, supra note 45, at 2.
60. Luxembourg IntellectualProperty Tax Regime, supra note 41, at 4; Luxembourg: Clarification on IP Regime,
supra note 40, at 3.
61. Luxembourg Intellectual Property Tax Regime, supra note 41, at 4; Luxembourg: Clarificationon IP Regime,
supra note 40, at 3.
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In sum, the Luxembourg IP box allows any Luxembourg taxpaying entity to exclude
from its taxes 80 percent of all net income derived from the commercialization, including
alienation, of a wide range of intellectual property rights, presently yielding a relatively
low 5.76 percent effective tax rate for such income. The IP box applies to both selfdeveloped and acquired intellectual property and requires only that the intellectual property not be acquired from an associated company and that all expenses directly related to
the intellectual property be properly capitalized in the first year the benefit of the IP box
regime is claimed by the taxpayer.
C.

THE NETHERLANDS

The Dutch Patent Box Tax Regime was originally enacted in 2007, but in the Netherlands' Tax Plan 2010, Dutch authorities significantly modified and expanded its patent box
tax regime to remain competitive in the competition for foreign innovative businesses; the
resulting tax regime became known as the Dutch Innovation Box. 62 The relevant provisions of the Dutch Innovation Box are presently codified in Article 12b of the Corporation
Tax Act 1969.63
The Dutch Innovation Box provides Dutch taxpayers with a flat 5 percent effective tax
rate on all net income derived from qualifying intellectual property. 64 This effective tax
rate represents a 50 percent decrease from the rate offered by the preceding patent box
statute, which offered a flat 10 percent effective tax rate and approximately an 80 percent
reduction of the statutory Dutch corporate income tax rate of 25.5 percent. 65 As the
phrase net income suggests, however, this favorable rate only applies to qualifying IPderived income once such revenue exceeds the development costs associated with the innovation. 66 Such losses related to qualifying intellectual property (e.g., accumulated de67
velopment costs) are currently deductible at the statutory tax rate of 25.5 percent.
The Dutch Innovation Box includes a broad range of intellectual property.68 The regime applies to income derived from not only patents-which need not be granted by
Dutch patent authorities but may instead be granted by any patent granting body-but
62. CabinetPresents Tax Measuresfor 2010: Focus on Making It Simpler and More Appealing to do Business in the
Netherlands, KPMG MEIJBURG & CO (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.meijburg.nl/en/market/latest-news/
Pages/Cabinetpresentstaxneasuresfor20l0.aspx.
63. Wet op de Vennootschapsbelasting 1969 [Corporate Tax Act of 1969], Stb. 1969, p. 445, art. 12b
(Neth.). Official publications of Dutch legislation and case law are not available in English. Translations and
interpretations by international business services and law firms will be provided as sources in the following
paragraphs. To corroborate the interpretations and other information contained herein, multiple unrelated
sources will be provided to the extent possible.
64. The New Dutch Innovation Box: A Tax Incentive for Innovation, ERNST & YOUNG 1 (2010), http://www.
bioporteurope.nl/publications/files/Innovation% 20box%20versie%20EN.pdf; Maxwell & Benesch, supra
note 4.
65. See The New Dutch Innovation Box, supra note 64, at 1; see also Margreet Nijhof & Michiel Kloes, An
Improved Tax Regime for Intangiblesin the Netherlands, 58 TAx NOTES INT'L 69, 69 (Apr. 5, 2010), available at
69
.pdf.
http://services.taxanalysts.con/taxbase/magdailypdfs.nsf/PDFs/58T10069.pdf$file/58TI0
66. The New Dutch Innovation Box, supra note 64, at 2-3; Wiecher Munting & Jeroen van der Wal, The
Dutch "Innovation Box": A Sound Alternative to Existing IP Structuring, Offering an ETR of 5% on R&D Activities, OTTERSPEER, HAASNOOT & PARTNERS 1 (May 9, 2011), http://www.ohp.nl/fileadinin/Documenten/
thomson_reutersarticleinnovation_box.pdf.
67. Munting & van der Wal, sipra note 66, at 1; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 6.
68. See Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 65, at 69; Maxwell & Benesh, supra note 4.
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also from all innovations and activities to which a so-called R&D declaration (alternatively, an R&D certificate) is issued. 69 R&D declarations, which are granted by an agency
of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs known as Agentschap NL, are generally issued
to all technological innovations that are deemed by Agentschap NL to be sufficiently innovative, but cannot be patented, or for which the developing company deems a patent to
be undesirable. 70 This includes, but is not limited to, such activities as "software development, the development of more efficient corporate processes (such as production
processes), and the development of all types of sustainable (resource) technology," as well
as trade secrets. 7 ' The box does not apply, on the other hand, to such things as trade
names, brands, or logos. 72 As will be discussed later, the distinction between patented
innovations and innovations for which R&D certificates are granted becomes important
when considering the location of the related research and development activities and the
related income to which the Innovation Box applies.
The Dutch regime generally applies only to self-developed intellectual property but
may also be applied to acquired intellectual property components that the company further develops. 7 3 Note, however, that the subsequent intellectual property, of which the
acquired intellectual property was a part, shall include (for the purposes of determining
the development costs threshold) the cost of the acquired intellectual property. 74 Practically speaking, this means that the IP-derived income must exceed the cost of the acquired
intellectual property plus additional research and development costs before the favorable
Innovation Box tax rate may apply.
Additionally, the regime permits the Dutch company to outsource some of its research
and development activities to contract research and development facilities and companies
located in other jurisdictions, but the extent to which a company may do this and still
qualify for the Innovation Box tax rate depends on whether the company holds a patent or
an R&D certificate. 75 For patented innovations, the Dutch statute merely requires that
the research and development activities "take place for the risk and account of the Dutch
taxpayer." 76 For innovations and intellectual property for which an R&D declaration is
obtained, however, the taxpayer must meet one of two requirements with regard to development: 77 the Dutch company commercializing the intellectual property right must have
either (1) actually coordinated, supervised, and managed the outsourced research and development activities; or (2) performed at least 50 percent of the research and development
itself in the Netherlands. 78 The 50 percent threshold was intended by the Dutch government to be a safe harbor for companies wishing to be certain that their in-house and
outsourced research and development activities would result in commercialization to
69. Maxwell & Benesh, supra note 4; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 6.
70. Maxwell & Benesh, supra note 4; Munting & van der Wal, supra note 66, at 2.
71. Munting & van der Wal, supra note 66, at 3; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 6.
72. The New Dutch Innovation Box, supra note 64, at 1; Munting & van der Wal, supra note 66, at 3.
73. Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4; Munting & van der Wal, supra note 66, at 3.
74. Munting & van der Wal, supra note 66, at 3.
75. Id.; Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 65, at 70; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 6.
76. Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 65, at 70; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 6.
77. Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 65, at 70; Shanahan, supra note 2, at 6.
78. Munting & van der Wal, supra note 66, at 3; Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 65, at 70; Shanahan, supra note
2, at 6.
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which a favorable tax rate may apply.79 The determination of how much of the research
was conducted by a given firm and in a given jurisdiction is generally made using arm's
length transfer pricing principles. 80
The Innovation Box applies broadly, and perhaps somewhat vaguely, to all income and
economic benefits derived from the innovative asset. 81 This includes "licensing the patents, using the intangible assets in one's regular business operations, and selling the intangible assets" (e.g., capital gains on the alienation of an intellectual property right).8 2 One
notable requirement regarding the income to which the regime may apply is that for patented intellectual property, "more than 30 percent of the derived income should be attributable to the patent right. ' 83 Regardless of the type of income, determinations regarding
the portion of income attributable to the qualifying intellectual property are made using
standard arm's length transfer pricing principles. 84 The Dutch government strongly recommends-but does not require-that companies meet individually with Dutch tax authorities to arrive at advance agreements regarding such issues as whether a given
intellectual property asset falls within the scope of the Innovation Box, what portion of
income should be allocated to the qualifying assets, and whether transfer pricing principles have been satisfactorily applied.85 In an effort to facilitate such preliminary negotiations and agreements, the Dutch authorities have established a dedicated team to deal with
86
Innovation Box rulings.
In sum, the Netherlands' modified Innovation Box tax regime provides Dutch taxpayers
with a comparatively low effective tax rate of 5 percent on income beyond a certain
threshold (i.e., the cost of developing the intangible) that is derived from a wide range of
intellectual property rights. The regime permits the taxable Dutch entity to conduct at
least some of its research and development activities in foreign jurisdictions or through
the employment of third-party contract research and development companies, and, to facilitate the process of qualifying for the regime, Dutch tax authorities have set up a dedicated team to issue advance rulings.
D. THE U.K.'s

PROPOSED PATENT

Box

Expressing its commitment to "creating the most competitive tax system in the G20,"
and stressing its belief that patents have a "particularly strong link to high-tech Research
and Development ...and manufacturing activity," the Government of the United Kingdom in November 2010 announced pending reforms to its taxation of innovation and
intellectual property, including the forthcoming addition of a patent box tax regime. 87 In
79. Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 65, at 70.
80. Id.
81. The PatentBox Will Become the Innovation Box with an Effective Tax Rate of5%, KPMG MEUBURG & CO.
1 (Sept. 2009), http://us.kpmg.com/microsite/TNF-Europe/2009/Sep/innovationBox.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 6. This limitation only applies to patented innovations and not to those
innovations that have been granted an R&D declaration. See id.

84. Munting & van der Wal, supra note 66, at 4; Maxwell & Benesch, supra
note 4.
85. Maxwell & Benesh, supra note 4.
86. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 6.
87. HM TREASURY, CONSULTATION ON THE PATENT Box 3, 5 (June 10, 2011), available at http://www.

hm-rreasury.gov.uk/d/consult._patent_box.pdf [hereinafter PATENT Box CONSULTATION].
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June 2011, Her Majesty's Treasury released its consultation on the proposed patent box
tax regime, a detailed report explaining the purpose, goals, structure, and mechanics of the
proposed plan, which, in the following months, was subject to criticism and comments
from the international business community.88 Subsequently, in December 2011, Her
Majesty's Treasury released its response to the consultation in which it addressed such
criticisms and set forth any changes it would make to the regime as a result of the responses it received to the consultation.8 9 The Treasury closed the comment period on
February 10, 2012 and plans to include a final version of its patent box regime in the
Finance Bill 2012, which will ultimately take effect in April 2013.90
The United Kingdom's proposed patent box plan is based on four so-called design principles: (1) a broad scope, (2) a formulaic approach, (3) an application to profits and not
receipts, and (4) benefits for active ownership and innovation rather than acquisition and
mere passive holding. 9i The patent box proposal allows companies to apply a flat 10 per92
cent effective tax rate to all qualifying net profits attributable to patents. This rate repof Corporate
Main
Rate
resents a 60 percent decrease from the United Kingdom's 2012
Tax of 25 percent. 93 The regime will potentially be applicable to all businesses "within the
scope of [United Kingdom] corporate tax[ation]" that will have the opportunity to elect to
94
receive the reduced rate of taxation as allowed under the regime. The 10 percent rate of
taxation will not apply to losses, which will remain fully deductible at their ordinary rate of
taxation; but, in an effort to maintain symmetry in the tax system, the patent box tax rate
will only be applied to qualifying income to the extent that it is greater than any patent
box losses or expenses (i.e., net IP-derived income). 95 Additionally, any expenditure surpluses will be deducted from the patent box revenues of other group companies in the
same period and any remaining losses will be carried forward and offset against future
qualifying profits.

96

The proposed U.K. patent box includes not only patents, but also applies to supplementary protection certificates, which extend the protection provided by a patent for innovations in the pharmaceutical and agrochemical industries, as well as certain other nonpatentable intellectual property rights, such as regulatory data protection and plant variety
88. Press Release, HM Treasury, Government Publishes Consultations on Patent Box and R&D Credits
Gone 10, 2011), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press-57- 1i.htm.
89. See HM TREASURY, THE PATENT Box: RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION 4 (Dec. 2011), available at
TO
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/condoc responses-patent-box.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSE
CONSULTATION].

90. Id. at 13. Although Her Majesty's Treasury is currently accepting proposed amendments to the patent
box legislation, it elected to disregard a majority of those proposals and comments it received to the original
consultation and is currently only accepting comments and proposals on those aspects of the proposed legislation that it modified in the response to consultation document. Therefore, it seems highly likely that those
aspects of the regime that remained unchanged in the response document will be included in their current
form in the final legislation. See id.
91. PATENT Box CONSULTATION, supra note 87, at 6.
92. Id. at 5.
93. CorporationTaxRates, HM REVNUE & CUSTOMs, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/corp.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2012). The 2013 Main Rate of Corporate Taxation is currently planned to fall to 24 percent; thus, the
extent to which the patent box regime reduces a corporation's tax liability will be marginal. See id.
94. PATENT- Box CONSULTATION, supra note 87, at 6.
95. RFSPONSE TO CONSULTATION, supra note 89, at 11-12.
96. Id.
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rights. 97 The patent box will not, however, apply to other forms of intellectual property,
such as trademarks or copyrights, because the U.K. Government does not feel that such
forms of intellectual property have a strong enough link to the high-tech activities to
which the regime is intended to appeal. 98 In its original consultation, the Treasury stated
its intention that the patent box regime apply only to patents and supplemental protection
certificates granted by the U.K.'s Intellectual Property Office or the E.U. Patent Office,
as it feared other patent granting authorities may be willing to grant patent rights to
innovations to which the Intellectual Property Office or European Patent Office would
not generally grant a patent. 99 But, in light of the response it received to this measure, the
Government is currently compiling "a list of other [E.U.] Member States that have patent
regimes with comparable patentability criteria and search and examination practices to the
[United Kingdom], with the intention of extending the Patent Box to include [patents
granted under] those regimes." 00
The proposed U.K. patent box regime applies to companies that hold legal ownership
of a qualifying intellectual property right, hold an exclusive license to a qualifying intellectual property right, or, in the event the right is held centrally in a group, where there is a
group agreement which confers to one of the companies therein the rights to use sell or
license the right.1OI Additionally, the U.K. regime applies to both self-developed and acquired qualifying intellectual property rights, but the latter is subject to a development
test. 102 The development test, as amended in the response to consultation, requires that
acquired intellectual property rights be further developed by the acquiring group or company. 103 In an effort to simplify regime qualification while still keeping passive intellectual
property holding companies beyond the scope of the patent box regime, the Treasury
provided in its consultation response that a company will qualify for the U.K. patent box
"if for substantially all of its IP rights it has either developed the IP itself, or it performs a
significant amount of the management activities," which for these purposes "will mean
formulating plans and making decisions in relation to the development or exploitation of
the IP rights."104 These rules provide, then, that a company or group may subcontract its
intellectual property research and development activities, provided it meets the management activities test set forth above.
Keeping with the broad scope design principle, the U.K. patent box will apply to a wide
range of income types. 05 The proposed plan will apply to income from royalty and licensing fees, embedded income in the sale of patented goods, income from the alienation
of a qualifying patent, and damages paid by a third party in a lawsuit for infringing a
patent right.'0 6 Additionally, in circumstances in which it is deemed appropriate (e.g.,
where it is deemed that a hypothetical third party would have been willing to pay a fee to
97. PATENT Box CONSULTATION, sifpra note 87, at 10.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 9.
100. RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION, supra note 89, at 10.
101. Id. The latter provision relating to group ownership arrangements was added in the consultation response and is subject to further amendment. See id.
102. PATENT Box CONSULTATION, supra note 87, at 10.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See PATEN'T Box CONSULTATION, supra note 87, at 13-15.

106. Id.
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use the patent or other intellectual property in the manner in which the company is using
it), income from the sale of goods manufactured using patented processes and income
10 7
from services will be included in the patent box calculation at an arm's length basis.
Arguably, the most notable, and perhaps the most controversial, feature of the U.K.
patent box is its use of a formulaic approach to calculating qualifying patent box profits.
Rather than requiring companies to make a vaguely-guided arm's length analysis of each
patent transaction that yields income for the company, Her Majesty's Treasury has instead
attempted to simplify and clarify the process by delineating a three-stop formulaic model
08
to determine the total qualifying innovation-based income.'
The first step in the U.K. model is to calculate how much of the company's total net
10 9
profit for the period is attributable to patents and other qualifying intellectual property.
To do this, the company's expenses and taxable profit must be apportioned pro-rata into
potentially qualifying patent-related income (i.e., income generally attributable to the revenue sources identified above) and non-patent income." 0 Recognizing that making such a
pro-rata split may be excessively difficult or unfeasible for some companies, the U.K. regime alternatively permits some companies to determine this amount by allocating income
and expenses to various "divisions" of the company using a "just and reasonable basis.""I
The second step in the model is to deduct from the net patent-related income an amount
attributable to routine activities of the enterprise." 2 This deduction is made by subtracting 10 percent of the company's expenses from the net patent-related income calculated in the first step.1 3 The result of this calculation is the residual income, or the
amount of the company's total patent-related income that is attributable to the patented
intellectual property of the company and no other non-IP-based value-adding activities
embedded in all of the company's products and services. 1 4 The final step recognizes that
other forms of intellectual property-namely, brand names-contribute considerably to a
given company's income and must be deducted from the residual income; therefore, this
step requires that a company "with marketing intangibles that contribute 10 [percent] or
more of their residual profit will be required to calculate an arm's length royalty for the
use of those intangibles in generating qualifying income."" 5 This amount, the amount
that represents the portion of residual income derived from brand name and other such
intangibles, will be taxed at the ordinary corporate tax rate, and the remaining amount is
the amount of income deemed to be attributable directly to patents and will be taxed at
107. Id. at 14.
108. See id. at 17.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. Id.; RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION, supra note 89, at 11. The Government originally intended for
companies using the "divisionalisation" alternative to step one to use transfer pricing methods to allocate its
income and expenses to divisions of the business; however, responses to the consultation suggested that such
an approach may be too complicated for many companies, so Treasury revised the approach in its response to
allow for allocation on a "just and reasonable basis." RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION, supra note 89, at 7, 11.
112. PATENT Box CONSULTATION, supra note 87, at 17.
113. Id.; RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION, supra note 89, at 11. The percentage markup was originally intended to be 15 percent, but the Treasury, recognizing that this rate may be excessive, reduced the rate to 10
percent in the consultation response. RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION, supra note 89, at 11.
114. PATENT Box CONSULTATION, supra note 87, at 17.
115. RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION, svpra note 89, at 11.
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the incentivized rate of 10 percent." 6 Again, recognizing that this step may be too complicated for smaller companies, the regime includes a safe harbor for smaller companies
whose profits fall below £1 million; for such companies, the government will assume that
25 percent of their residual income is derived from non-qualifying intangibles and the
117
remaining 75 percent shall be taxed at a rate of 10 percent.
In summation, the U.K. patent box proposal provides all U.K. corporation-tax-paying
businesses with a flat 10 percent tax rate on all net income derived from self-developed or
acquired and subsequently developed patents and supplemental protection certificates,
with the caveat that the patents or certificates must be granted by the United Kingdom or
other qualifying European Union patent-granting offices. Though the regime requires
development of the patent, its standards are relatively loose and permit a company to
outsource its research and development, provided it maintains a minimum level of managerial control over the activities. The regime applies broadly to a wide range of patentrelated income, and, finally, provides taxpayers with a formulaic three-step model for calculating what portion of their income qualifies as patent-derived.
E. A COMPARISON

OF THE PATENT

Box

REGIMES IN LIGHT OF THE GOALS OF THE

REGIMES

1. Effective Tax Rates
Of the four patent box regimes compared, the Dutch Innovation Box provides the lowest effective tax rate of 5 percent.'" s This rate represents 50 percent of the proposed-but
almost certain-U.K. patent box rate of 10 percent,' 19 86.81 percent of the current Luxembourg rate of 5.76 percent, 120 and 73.53 percent of the current Belgian rate of 6.8
percent. 121 In fact, the Dutch Innovation Box rate is the lowest patent box tax rate in the
world, with all other current patent box effective rates ranging from 5.76 percent to the 15
percent rate offered by the French and Spanish regimes. 22 Additionally, of the regimes
considered herein, only the Dutch and proposed U.K. patent regimes provide flat effective
tax rates, while the regimes in Belgium and Luxembourg offer incentivized rates in the
form of a deduction from the ordinary corporate income tax rate. 23 This suggests that
patent income rates in the latter two regimes are perhaps more susceptible to fluctuations,
as their effective rates are directly tied to their ordinary corporate rates, whereas the former two regimes may continue to provide steady rates despite potential changes in their
respective country's ordinary corporate tax rates.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 8.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. James Shanahan, Innovation Tax Policy around the World, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.itpf.pwc.com/ITPF/TPF.nsf/O/e22cce556f8a4c2b85257998005e6fd6/$FILE/Shanahan%20-%
20ITPF,%20AEI%20Innovation%2OTax%2OPolicy%20-%20Shanahan%20(01.16.12).ver%203.pdf.
123. Shanahan, supra note 2, at 8.
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2. Scope of Intellectual Property Covered
Consideration of the scope of intellectual property that qualifies for the various regimes

actually involves addressing two distinct aspects of the boxes: (1) which types of intellectual property qualify and (2) the extent to which acquiredor third-party developed intellectual property qualify. In general, the Belgian patent income deduction regime and the
proposed patent box regime in the United Kingdom cover considerably fewer types of
intellectual property than the regimes in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 124 The former two regimes generally apply only to patents and supplemental patent certificates, 125
while the Luxembourg regime extends its preferential rate to patents, supplemental patent
protection certificates, trademarks, brands, designs, domain names, models, and software
copyrights, 126 and the Dutch Innovation Box extends broadly to all those innovations that
the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs deems sufficiently innovative to the corporation
itself.127 While at first glance it appears that the Belgian and U.K. regimes are simply not
competitive when it comes to patent box scope, when considering the innovations covered
by a regime, one must recall the general purpose of a patent box: to encourage innovative
and high-tech companies to conduct substantial research and development activities in a
given country and to subsequently commercialize the resulting patents through extensive
manufacturing in said country. 128 In light of this aim, one may argue that the inclusion in
a patent box regime of such things as trademarks or new software does little to further the
ultimate purpose of the regime, as such innovations are considerably less likely to lead to
substantial technical research and subsequent manufacturing than patents and supplemental protection certificates 129
None of the tax regimes considered herein completely bars income from acquired intellectual property from their patent box. 130 That said, of the four, only the Luxembourg IP
box allows for income derived from acquired intellectual property to be taxed at the preferential rate without the requirement for additional development.' 31 The other three regimes all have some requirement that the acquiring company further develop the patent or
intellectual property before commercializing it and claiming subsequent income under the
patent box. 132 Of the three regimes requiring further development, only the Dutch regime requires that any of the subsequent development occur within domestic borders (and
this requirement is not so much a requirement but a safe harbor provision). 33 Both the
United Kingdom and Belgium generally permit all further development to occur in foreign jurisdictions. 134 The four regimes are essentially on a level playing field when it
comes to their treatment of acquired intellectual property; while three of them require
124. Shanahan, supra note 122, at 15.
125. Id.
126. Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 144.
127. See Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4. Recall that this generally includes a wide range of innovations
including corporate processes and software development but does not extend to brand names, trademarks,
and logos. See Shanahan, supra note 122, at 15.
128. PATENT Box CONSULTATION, supra note 87, at 3, 5.
129. See id. at 6.
130. Shanahan, supra note 122, at 16.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Nijhof & Kloes, supra note 65, at 70.
134. Shanahan, supra note 122, at 17.
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some additional development acquired intellectual property, none has any strict requirement establishing the extent to which the patent must be further developed, and further,
none requires such further development to lead to the granting of a new patent. 135 Considering, again, the two goals of a patent box regime-domestic research investment and
substantial subsequent commercialization (i.e., manufacturing)-allowing income derived
from acquired patents to be taxed at a preferential rate, without the requirement for substantial additional domestic development, seems to fail to achieve the former goal of a
patent box regime. This concession could permit a domestic company to simply purchase
intellectual property from a third party, outsource the property for minimal additional
development, then commercialize the property and take advantage of the patent box's
preferential tax treatment without any real research and development expenditures in the
country granting the preferential treatment. In theory then, while each of the regimes
included in this comparison and, in fact, nearly every other patent box regime in the
world, is on, essentially, a level playing field with regard to its treatment of acquired and
foreign-developed intellectual property, 136 a model could theoretically be adopted that
would better tie the patent box to domestic research and development activities.
3.

Income Subject to PatentBox Rates

Similar to the scope of the intellectual property comparison above, a discussion of the
extent of income covered by each regime includes a consideration of two separate aspects
of the regimes: (1) the types of income to which the patent box applies (e.g., royalty income, embedded income, capital gains income) and (2) whether the box applies to gross or
net income. The proposed U.K. patent box regime currently applies to the widest range
of income. 137 It broadly applies to royalty and licensing income, embedded income in the
sale of patented goods (including, in some cases, the sale of goods created using a patented
process), capital gains income, income resulting from a lawsuit for patent infringement,
and income from patented services. 138 While it is possible that applying the patent box tax
rate to such a wide range of income could work to offset the relatively high effective tax
rate afforded taxpayers by the proposed regime, this would only be the case for taxpaying
companies with diversified patent-related income sources. A non-manufacturing company
that solely develops and licenses new technology, for example, would not benefit from the
wider range of income included in the proposed U.K. regime and would likely opt to
develop and hold its intellectual property in a country with a lower patent box rate.
Both the Dutch Innovation Box and Luxembourg IP Box apply to royalty income from
licensing qualifying intellectual property, intellectual property income embedded in the
price of manufactured goods, and income from the sale of qualifying intellectual property. 139 The Belgian patent income deduction regime, on the other hand, applies to the
fewest types of income, applying only to royalty income and embedded patent income; the
135. Id. at 16.
136. Id. at 16-17.
137. Id. at 15-17.
138. PATENT Box CONSULTATION, supra note 87, at 13-15.
139. Shanahan, supra note 122, at 16-17.

FALL 2012

930

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

regime is the only one considered in this paper to not include income from the sale of
qualifying intellectual property' 4°
Of the four tax regimes considered in this paper, the Belgian regime is the only one that
applies to gross qualifying income.' 41 Each of the other regimes applies only to net qualifying income; thus, qualifying income is taxed preferentially only to the extent it exceeds
the costs of developing the related patent. 42 For companies whose research and development costs are substantial and the extent of future profits is questionable, the Belgian
regime may be preferable as it allows those companies to receive a reduced tax rate even if
the often substantial costs of developing the intellectual property have not yet been
recouped.
4. Final Comparative Thoughts
Commenters have suggested that, in its current form, the proposed U.K. patent box
regime is not competitive with those regimes presently enacted in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (commonly called the Benelux regimes). 43 The proposed regime
has been criticized for three distinct shortfalls: (1) an effective rate too high to draw in
foreign investment, (2) application to a limited selection of intellectual property, and (3) a
formulaic approach that will likely end up complicating the regime more than making it
clear and easy to implement. 144 The Benelux regimes, on the other hand, are much more
competitive with one another, with each possessing its own relative strengths and weaknesses. The Belgian patent income deduction regime has a slightly higher effective tax
rate than the other two Benelux regimes, but it is the only regime in the group to apply to
gross patent-derived income. 45 The Dutch regime's biggest strength is that the tax rate
provided by the regime is lower than any other patent box tax rate in the world. 146 The
Luxembourg regime combines a very competitive sub-six percent tax rate with coverage of
47
the widest range of intellectual property, including trademarks and brand names.'
Perhaps the most notable weakness of all four regimes is that each permits some, if not
all, of the associated research and development to occur offshore. While each claims to
increase research and development and commercialization activities in the taxing country,
the fact that each allows for offshore development and preferential tax treatment of licensing income paints a different picture. Under all of the regimes considered in this paper, a
company could theoretically purchase patents from a third party, contract with a research
and development company in a foreign jurisdiction to have the patents marginally further
developed, and then hold the patent in the patent box country and license it to other
companies for subsequent manufacturing. In doing so, the hypothetical company would
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4; see PwC Responds to HM Treasury'sPatentBox Consultation Document,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (June 13, 2011, 5:47 PM), http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/News-Releases/PwC-responds-to-HM-Treasury-s-Patent-Box-Consultation-Document- lOaO.aspx.
144. Maxwell & Benesch, supra note 4; Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The U.K Patent Box: Extraordinary Complexity, 133 TAx NoTEs 1307, 1307 (Dec. 12, 2011).
145. Eynatten & Brauns, supra note 36, at 45.
146. Shanahan, supra note 122, at 15.
147. Id.
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be able to take advantage of a patent box regime without conducting any research and
development or participating in any manufacturing activities in its domestic country. As
one analyst remarked of the U.K. patent box regime, "it is really only an incentive for
holding patent rights. Job creation is optional." 148 The reason for this seemingly obvious
shortfall is simple: The European Union prohibits member nations from conditioning
commercialization incentives on the performance of research and development within that
nation.149 In fact, at one time, Ireland's now-extinct patent box required that the research
and development giving rise to the patent be conducted in Ireland. 150 In 2007, however,
the European Union ruled that Ireland's patent box regime was "contrary to Articles 43,
48 and 49 of the [European Commission] Treaty" and formally requested that Ireland
change its law. 151 Therefore, as a result of these four nations' membership in the European Union, they have been limited in the extent to which they could enact optimal patent
box legislation.
Hl. Considerations in Whether the United States Should Adopt a Patent
Box Regime
A.

PREFACE

Recently there have been calls from both international fiscal policy organizations and
notable tax commenters for the United States to adopt a patent box tax regime if it is
serious about remaining competitive in the global marketplace and reassuming its position
152
as the dominant country in the high-tech innovations and manufacturing industries.
Additionally, in a recent report before the House of Representatives Ways and Means
Committee, the Joint Committee on Taxation expressed concern over the rate at which
multinational companies that develop and receive patents in the United States are subsequently moving their patents to off-shore jurisdictions where the commercialization of
such patents would not be nearly as expensive from a taxation standpoint. 153 Research
suggests that though the United States presently remains reasonably competitive in terms
of levels of domestic high-tech innovation, it is quickly falling behind its competitors as
evidenced by its relative rate of innovative progress over the last decade. 154 That is to say,
while the United States is currently competitive in the market for innovative businesses,
its once dominant position is slowly eroding as the rest of the world takes steps to create a
more enticing environments for innovative businesses.
148. Sullivan, supra note 144, at 1307.
149. Atkinson & Andes, supra note 1, at 12-13.
150. Id.
151. Press Release, European Union, Direct Taxation: Commission Requests Ireland to End Discriminatory
Rules on Tax Treatment of Patent Royalties (Mar. 23, 2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/07/408.
152. E.g., Atkinson & Andes, supra note 1, at 17-19.
153. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, I11iTH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATED
TO POSSIBLE INCOME SIFT-ING AND TRANSFER PRICING, at 13 (Comm. Print 2010).

154. See Robert D. Atkinson & Scott Andes, The Atlantic Century 1: Benchmarking EU & U.S. Innovation and
Competitiveness Innovation (Info. Tech. & Innovation Found., Washington, D.C.), July 2011, at 6, 13, available
at http://www.itif.org/files/2011-atlantic-century.pdf.
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Certainly the enactment of patent box legislation appears to be a possible solution to
the U.S. innovation and manufacturing crisis, but several factors must first be considered
before ultimately determining that a patent box tax regime is the proper answer to the
problem. First, one must consider the overall international tax competition debate and
determine whether participating therein is the proper solution to any fiscal concern.
Next, attention must be given the actual effects of the currently available patent box tax
regimes, as theoretical benefits do not necessarily yield real world advantages. Third,
consideration must be paid any additional benefits beyond the scope of present patent box
research the United States could realize from the enactment of a patent box regime. Finally, one must consider how a U.S. patent box could theoretically be structured to best
address the concerns of tax commenters and the Joint Committee on Taxation.
B.

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION TO WHAT END?

A discussion and analysis of the various patent box tax regimes and the possibility of
enacting such a regime in the United States would be incomplete if not considered within
the wider context of the current international tax competition debate. Generally speaking,
international tax competition occurs when national governments attempt to entice multinational enterprises to invest within the borders of that country through the use of attractive effective corporate tax rates.' 55 In other words, a competing government attempts
to lure additional outside investment "by reducing its tax claims on any income generated
from such investments, thus raising the investors' post-tax returns." 156 This phenomenon
of governments attempting to lure away investment from other nations using lower tax
rates arose in the mid-1980s when technological innovations began increasing the mobility of corporate capital such that relocating capital from one nation to another became a
relatively simple and painless process. 157 Some commenters have proposed that intergovernmental tax competition may lead to beneficial pressure on inefficient government
spending, 58 or, similarly, that such competition may actually drive rates down to their
actual optimal level that would otherwise not be reached because self-serving governments
would maintain higher than necessary rates, which could ultimately limit economic
growth and output. 159 Many other commenters, however, have argued that this phenomenon, wherein countries will repeatedly attempt to "one up" one another with increasingly
shrinking effective tax rates, will ultimately result in a "race to the bottom," which, in
turn, will result in severe "downward pressure on corporate income taxes [that] will lead to
a loss of revenue, and thus provide a constraint on government activity." 160 To this end,
commenters have suggested that patent boxes may simply be another tool of tax competition that could result in reduced tax revenues across the board and that tax cooperation
155. Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective an InternationalTax Competition, 89 GEo. LJ.
543, 546 (Mar. 2001).
156. Id.
157. Michael P. Devereux et al., Corporate Income Tax Reforms and InternationalTax Competition, 17 ECON.
POL'y 449, 451-52 (2002).
158. Roin, supra note 155, at 546.
159. Toban Wiebe, The Benefits of Tax Competition, TAX FoUND. (July 25, 2011), http://www.taxfoundation.
org/blog/show/27478.html.
160. Devereux et al., supra note 157, at 452.
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may ultimately yield a more beneficial result for governments.'16 A detailed discussion of
the merits of the respective arguments of the tax competition debate is beyond the scope
of this paper, as, for the time being, the reality of the situation is clear: despite calls for tax
harmonization, intergovernmental tax competition is alive and well. And short of a select
few European Union and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
rules designed to prevent what is deemed "unfair tax competition-such as the European
Commission's ruling on the Irish patent box discussed above, governments are reasonably
free to adjust their tax rates as they see fit and are, in fact, expected by businesses to lower
rates to remain competitive with other competitor nations in the global economy. 162 For
this reason, it makes sense that the United States must at least consider enacting patent
box tax legislation if it wishes to remain competitive with the United Kingdom, the
Benelux nations, and all other nations currently offering high tech innovative businesses a
patent box regime as an incentive to hold and commercialize patents domestically.
C.

THEORETICAL AND REAL WORLD EFFECTS OF CuRRENT PATENT Box REGIMES

Given the novelty of patent box tax regimes, there is currently little in the way of empirical evidence as to the effects of those regimes on the tax revenues of enacting governments. The Institute of Fiscal Studies, however, recently published a briefing note in
which the authors simulate the effects of the Benelux regimes and the proposed United
Kingdom regime on the location of patents in various European nations and the estimated
effects the regimes will have on various tax revenues of the European Countries and the
United States. 163 While the empirical data presented in this study lacks the detail to allow
the drawing of any conclusions regarding the effects of individual patent box variables,
such as effective rate or intellectual property scope, it is sufficient to draw preliminary
conclusions regarding the big-picture effects of patent box regimes. 164 The study found
that the introduction of patent box regimes yields a noticeable increase in the country's
share of newly created patents. 165 For instance, the authors estimate that following the
introduction of the U.K. regime, the United Kingdom's share of newly created patents
will increase to 17 percent. 166 By contrast, its share of newly created patents before the
existence of the Benelux regime was 12 percent, and its share of these patents after the
introduction of the Benelux regimes was 8 percent. Somewhat predictably, the study
found that the introduction of patent box legislation leads to an increase in patent share,
but as other countries introduce their own patent boxes, that share will recede, although
will likely remain above pre-patent box levels. 167 While this finding is both unsurprising
and a seemingly promising result for patent box advocates, later findings in the study
suggest that patent boxes, at least in their current form, may not be as effective as they are
161.
162.
2012)
more
163.

Griffith & Miller, supra note 13.
About Us, RATE COALITION, http://www.ratecoalition.com/index.php/about-us (last visited Oct. 1,
(calling for reform of the U.S. tax system, including a decrease in corporate tax rates to bring the rates
in line with other developed nations).
Rachel Griffith et al., Corporate Taxes and Intellectualproperty: Simulating the Effects of Patent Boxes, LNST.
FOR FiscAL STUD. (Nov. 2010), http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bn112.pdf.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 7.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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intended to be. The second major finding in the study relates to the effect of patent boxes
on short-term tax revenue. The study, as it related to tax revenue, was bifurcated: first, it
addressed the effect the Benelux regimes would have on tax revenue from income related
to new patents across the European Union and the United States; and second, it considered the effect of adding the U.K.'s proposed regime would have on patent-related revenue in those same nations. 168 The authors' simulations provide that, following the
introduction of the Benelux regimes, tax income strictly from new patent revenue fell
drastically in each of the fifteen countries considered, with revenues related to new patents
falling more than 50 percent in several nations and with the nations suffering from the
largest decrease in patent revenue being those enacting the patent box regimes. 169 This
finding suggests that while patent boxes are likely to attract a greater share of new patents,
the increase in patent applications is unlikely to come close to making up for the significandy reduced tax rate of income derived from those patents. The trend is predicted to
continue as more patent boxes are introduced, with the study predicting that following the
introduction of the U.K. patent box regime, tax revenues will decrease in every nation,
with the United Kingdom suffering the largest decrease in revenue. 170 These results present a startling, but not altogether surprising, conclusion: the continued introduction of
patent box tax regimes is likely to lead to a decrease in new patent-related income in all
developed nations, with the enacting nations experiencing the most significant immediate
171
reduction in revenue.
While this early study does not paint a rosy picture for patent box regimes, there are
several caveats that must be noted in considering the findings of the study. First, the study
measures only the immediate static effects of enacting patent box legislation. 172 That is,
the study only contemplated two factors in calculating the potential tax revenue conse73
quences of the patent box regimes: (1) effective tax rates and (2) share of new patents.1
The potential and desired consequences of patent box regimes, however, is not merely to
increase revenue directly from taxes on patent income by increasing patent income to a
large enough extent to overcome the reduced tax rate, but rather to drive the economy as
a whole by increasing employment and high-tech exports and encouraging additional research, development, and innovation efforts in the nation. 174 These potential outcomes
are not modeled in this study, and in fact, are likely particularly difficult to study empirically in this context given the novelty of patent box regimes and the sheer number of
75
variables that play a role in achieving those outcomes.
In addition, the study fails to account for another frequently stated benefit of patent box
regimes-the domestic market may bear a higher tax rate on relatively immobile, location-specific income if such a rate is supported by a significantly reduced tax rate on income from more mobile assets, such as patents and intellectual property.176 In other
words, proponents contend that a government may be able to maintain a relatively high
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
See id.
Atkinson & Andes, supra note 1, at 10.
Griffith et al., supra note 163, at 11.
Atkinson & Andes, supra note 1, at 10.
See id. at 11.
Id.
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general corporate tax rate by providing companies with a lower rate of taxation on mobile
asset-derived income. The logic behind this argument is that companies displeased with
the corporate tax rate in a given location can-and in fact will-relocate mobile assets to
locations offering lower tax rates, but will likely be unable to relocate immobile or location-specific assets. This relocation of mobile assets to offshore locations then applies
downward pressure on the corporate tax rate, as the domestic government struggles to
make up for lost revenue from the assets transferred offshore.1 77 Instead of substantially
reducing the general corporate tax rate to entice firms to repatriate their mobile assets,
however, the government may lower the rate on income from only those mobile assets it
seeks to bring back from foreign locations, thus relieving some of the downward pressure
on the general corporate tax rate. 178 This potential benefit is particularly relevant in a
country like the United States, which has one of the highest corporate tax rates of all
OECD nations and is currently subject to calls from tax commenters to reduce corporate
179
tax rates to remain competitive with other OECD countries.
A final note regarding this preliminary patent box study-one which was conceded by
the authors in a subsequent publication-is that the study fails to address how countries
without patent boxes will fare in the future with regards to tax revenue as more and more
countries enact patent box legislation. I80 In the words of the authors: "in a world in
which, say most European countries are expected to introduce some form of Patent Box, it
is possible that tax revenues would fall even more if the [United Kingdom] did not introduce the Patent Box."181 This leads to a realization that parallels the conclusion above
regarding participating in intergovernmental tax competition: regardless of the likelihood
that patent boxes will, at least in the short term, lead to noticeable reductions in tax revenue, the reduction that would likely follow a sustained failure to compete for mobile assets
would likely exceed the predicted post-patent box reduction while providing none of the
potential big-picture benefits of the patent box. That is to say, in light of the frequency in
which the United States' economic competitors are passing patent box legislation, not
competing may simply not be an option. Instead of discussing the merits of whether or
not the United States should enact a patent box regime, then, perhaps the discussion
should center around determining how to design the best patent box.
D. THE U.S. PATENT Box: MAXIMIZING BENEFICIAL OUTCOMES WHERE
EUROPEAN REGIMES COULD NOT

In considering a potential ideal patent box structure for the United States, a key assumption will be made regarding the hypothetical U.S. patent box regime: the ultimate
goals of such a regime would be both (1) to increase research and development activity
within the United States and (2) to increase subsequent commercialization efforts within
the United States. With this assumption in mind, there are at least two important elements that a U.S. patent box should possess to stand out in an ever-growing sea of similar
177. Griffith & Miller, supra note 13.

178. Id.
179. See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: A Grown-Up Conversation about Corporate Tax, 134 TAx
NOTES 1051, 1051 (Feb. 27, 2012).
180. Griffith & Miller, supra note 13.
181. Id.
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regimes: (1) a method of directly tying preferential taxation of patent-related income to
domestic research and commercialization and (2) a reasonable level of simplicity. Note that
in light of the lack of evidence regarding the effect individual aspects of a patent box, such
as effective rate and scope of intellectual property, actually have on research and development and commercialization activities, it is virtually impossible to predict with certainty
how the United States should address those aspects at this time. It can be said with some
certainty, however, that a domestic research-commercialization link and simplicity would
help a U.S. patent box in achieving its assumed goals.
As Robert Atkinson and Scott Andes stress in their 2011 report on patent boxes, establishing a connection between the reduced tax rate and domestic research and development
and the commercialization of qualifying intellectual property would be pivotal in addressing the United States' "noticeable state of [manufacturing] decline throughout the last
decade. " 182 The closest and most obvious form of this linkage would be to simply condition receipt of the reduced patent box tax rate on a taxpayer's conducting both the research and development giving rise to the patent and the subsequent manufacturing of
patented goods in the United States.' 8 3 Therefore, in order to qualify for the patent box
regime, a company would have to establish that it conducted its research and development
in the United States, or for acquired patents, that additional development occurred in the
United States and that subsequent related manufacturing activities occurred in the United
States. In the event the patenting company elects to not manufacture any goods with its
new patent but rather licenses those patents to third parties, the company would only have
to establish that the patents were developed and are currently held in the United States to
qualify for the patent box. In either case, creating such a link between the preferential tax
rate and domestic research and commercialization would allow the United States to mitigate potential revenue reductions and realize greater tangential benefits from its patent
box in a way that no European nation has been able to do.
The other essential element of a potential U.S. patent box would be simplicity. There
is currently a growing number of major businesses calling for reforms to the U.S. tax
system to address the complexity of the tax code.184 These businesses-the very parties to
whom the regime would be targeted-would be reluctant to take advantage of an unnecessarily complex patent box regime when simpler regimes are available overseas. In light of
criticisms the United Kingdom has received for the formulaic approach it took to calculating qualifying income in its proposed patent box regime, 185 the United States could simplify its patent box regime by using established transfer pricing methods to determine
qualifying income and establishing dedicated panels of tax professionals to quickly provide
rulings to businesses seeking to take advantage of the patent box regime. While such
measures to simplify the regime would not, in and of themselves, ensure the success of a
U.S. patent box, they would certainly be a substantial step in competing with those European and Asian boxes that are considered to be more complex.
As for the other elements of a potential patent box regime-of which there are manyit is simply beyond the scope of this article to attempt to predict how those should be
structured. Absent substantial empirical evidence regarding how those elements affect a
182. Atdnson & Andes, supra note 1, at 18.
183. Id.
184. RATE COALTON, supra note 162.
185. Sullivan, supra note 144, at 1307.
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patent box's success, and in light of the extent to which such elements would likely be
subject to the bidding of political lobbyists, predictions regarding such patent box aspects
presently serve a very limited purpose. At this point, however, two things seem clear: (1)
it is unlikely that the United States will be able to remain competitive in innovative industries if it does not enact a patent box and (2) the extent to which such a regime would

achieve its desired goals would depend on the extent to which it connected tax benefits to
domestic activities and on the extent to which businesses could take advantage of it with-

out combatting significant complexity.
IV.

Conclusion

There can be little doubt that patent boxes are shaping up to be the latest tool in the
international competition to encourage domestic innovation and commercialization. In
the last five years, nine nations have established patent box regimes, and those regimes-

specifically those in the Benelux nations and the United Kingdom-have provided a
blueprint upon which the United States can improve to re-position itself as the worldwide
leader in high-tech research and manufacturing. To do so, a U.S. patent box would need
to be reasonably simple while remaining competitive with its European counterparts in
terms of effective tax rates, scope of income, and scope of intellectual property. But, more
importantly, a U.S. patent box would need to establish a firm connection between the
receipt of preferential taxation to domestic research and commercialization activities in a
way the European regimes have been unable to do. Such a connection would ensure that
the patent box does not merely become a haven for holding companies, but rather encourage the active development and commercialization of new intellectual property. In so
enacting a patent box, the United States could address, in large part, the criticisms of both
the academic and business communities regarding its declining international competitiveness and reestablish itself as a leader in innovation and manufacturing.
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